Published on: 2026-07-28
Source: Central Bank of Russia – Central Bank of Russia –
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Why cases of market manipulation are investigated for years, how control over influencers’ activities will be carried out, why a fast securities transfer service is being introduced, as well as the specifics of regulating insiders’ activities, were discussed in an interview with Kommersant by Kirill Pronin, head of the financial market infrastructure department of the Bank of Russia.
– In the spring of 2026, one of the most notable events in the market manipulation control segment was the arrest of the three owners of the Telegram channels “MarketsMoneyPower|MMP”, “Wolf from Moscow Exchange”, and “RCB Signals”. What events led the regulator to pay attention to the activities of these platforms?
– This group of Telegram channels has long been under our observation. We compared their comments and calls, which were broadcast on the channels, with the actual actions of investors in the stock market. For example, they publish an informational message about a security with a forecast of its price increase. And soon investors—subscribers to the channel—begin making transactions with these assets. We also paid attention to the trading activity of the influencers themselves and found that in several cases they made opposite trades with these securities even before the news was published. For almost three years we conducted thorough checks before handing the materials over to the Investigative Committee.
– Three years – quite a long period. In all cases of revealing such schemes, did the investigation take so much time?
– It depends heavily on each case. It is possible to quickly identify certain signs indicating unusual activity. But to prove that a violation or crime was committed, one must not only describe the general facts but literally examine each transaction and calculate the income received.
– In the cases with RDV, the number of operations was measured in tens of thousands, and not all calculations could be performed automatically. Considering the large number of participants in this process, a lot of time was spent on necessary interviews and document study. It was necessary to gather an indisputable evidentiary base.
– Approximately what was the amount of income?
– We do not disclose the exact amount. But we can say that it exceeded the threshold set by the Criminal Code for criminal prosecution. It currently stands at 3.75 million rubles.
– Which specific papers became the objects of manipulation?
– We cannot disclose this information until the investigation is complete. All stages of the criminal process must first be completed.
– In this case, were the defendants offered cooperation, such as entering into an agreement with the Bank of Russia?
– The Bank of Russia can conclude an agreement only if it concerns an administrative offense. Moreover, the initiative always comes from the person against whom the case has been initiated. But here we are dealing with a criminal offense, so concluding an agreement is beyond the competence of the Bank of Russia.
– These channels continue their activities to this day. Does this mean that they have ceased their practice due to the arrest of the owners/administrators? Does the Central Bank continue to monitor the activities of these channels?
– Yes, we continue to monitor what is happening in these channels. And it must be said that so far we do not see any direct signs of manipulation.
– There is currently a discussion about creating a registry of influencers. Is there a plan to require those who join the registry to disclose their investment accounts so that monitoring their trading activity becomes even more transparent?
– There is not yet an approved configuration. However, even now we have the authority to monitor the movement of funds in trading accounts if the investor’s activity raises suspicions. But this does not mean that we constantly suspect everyone: we have a risk-oriented approach to supervision. I want to emphasize that we are starting to pay closer attention specifically to those who give us reasons. We are not conducting a witch hunt.
– How does the Central Bank simultaneously monitor the activities of all influencers? How does it determine that the actions of bloggers actually involve manipulation?
– We continuously monitor the operations of all market participants in automatic mode and keep an eye on a large number of financial Telegram channels. We detect unusual activities of market participants and correlate them with postings on these resources.
But this does not mean that we focus on every publication. We look at all deviations collectively and start an investigation if anomalous trading activity correlates with calls in channels to buy or sell a particular asset. We pay attention to the reliability of the information disseminated in such channels.
In addition, we have a special mailing service on the Bank of Russia’s website where we accept anonymous messages about market manipulation and insider trading. Since the launch of the service earlier this year, we have received over 150 messages in which senders draw attention to unfair practices, including those in Telegram channels. And it must be said that there are facts worthy of our attention, but there are also “empty” messages.
– And how has the activity of anonymous informants changed up to the present time?
– We no longer receive the large influx of messages that we did at the very beginning. Now we get fewer messages (two to three per week), but they usually contain interesting information worthy of thorough examination.
– Is the Bank of Russia considering increasing the role of professional participants, primarily brokers, in combating market manipulators?
– They are already actively involved. Even today, there is a fairly large volume of requirements for brokers and managers regarding the establishment of their own compliance and counteraction against unscrupulous practices. They have the obligation not just to build compliance, but to analyze all non-standard client transactions and forward the information to us. Moreover, in 2024, we improved regulation and gave trading participants the ability to receive information from the exchange about significant deviations in non-standard operations. Based on this, they can inquire with their client about the reasons for such a transaction, so the material we ultimately receive becomes of higher quality. We also gave brokers certain recommendations about what information needs to be included in these notifications.
— And how often do professional participants inform the Central Bank about such client actions?
– The quality and quantity of notifications received from financial market participants is increasing. This year, on average, we receive 20–25 notifications per month.
– According to data from the Central Bank, the number of detected cases of market manipulation from 2020 to 2023 was measured in dozens per year, while in 2025 their number exceeded two hundred. What is this dynamic related to?
– The main reason is that the number of retail investors in the Russian market has increased significantly. And many of them are non-qualified investors. As a rule, they do not have a sufficient level of knowledge of the law “On combating the illegal use of insider information and market manipulation” and do not always understand what they are allowed to do and what they are not. Here we try to conduct explanatory work together with professional participants.
The second is a rather low level of compliance among some market participants. We also work with such companies, conducting separate inspections of how their compliance operates, issuing orders for violations, and even bringing them to administrative responsibility.
Another problem is the disproportion between fines and the severity of violations committed, which does not contribute to strengthening discipline in the market. Currently, the fine for an individual for manipulation and insider trading ranges from 3,000 to 5,000 rubles, while for a legal entity it is 700,000 rubles. If a trading participant earns 1 million rubles from manipulation, it costs them nothing to pay a fine of 3,000 or 5,000 rubles. The idea is to move toward increasing economic responsibility in the future.
– Is there a set of indicators that the Central Bank pays attention to and immediately begins an investigation?
— We have many algorithms that monitor unusual activity. Speaking about the general logic, there will always be an immediate reaction and investigation triggered when we see that after a large transaction with securities, a good piece of news about the issuer comes out a day or two later. Meanwhile, the buyer who benefitted from the price increase starts selling the securities, i.e., taking profits. In 100% of cases, this will attract our attention. Next, we need to determine who that was: an insider or not. If it was not an insider, it could be a person related to the company, and we need to establish this connection. This is also not always easy. Then we begin our checks.
There are signals when we see that someone from an investment company or broker begins front-running their clients. That is, knowing about an upcoming large transaction that will lead to an increase in the stock price, they buy these shares in advance, before executing their client’s order, and then sell them later, but at a higher price. Our models allow us to promptly identify such cases. We are currently conducting investigations on a number of such cases. Measures have already been taken on some facts.
– The Central Bank’s statistics show that the overwhelming majority of violations were classified under part 2 of article 5 of Federal Law 224-FZ, “Actions related to market manipulation.” This provision covers a wide range of violations. Is it possible to identify the most frequent among them?
– Most of the violations for which we hold people accountable are violations related to conducting transactions in an anonymous exchange order book based on prior agreements. The law against market manipulation was enacted to ensure, on one hand, that no one deceives or misleads investors, and on the other, to maintain a fair price for the asset. Accordingly, when a transaction is agreed upon, it violates the integrity of price formation. That is, if the parties made the transaction without knowing each other, the transaction price might have been different. Moreover, other participants see their price and use it as a reference.
– Why do they do that?
– In most cases, transactions by agreement are carried out to transfer securities from one broker to another or to transfer a package of securities between related parties – for example, between relatives or affiliated companies. Investors sit down with their relatives at one table, place matching orders in the order book, and press a button. As a result of the investigation, we find out that the operation was conducted almost from the same device or from the same IP address. Then they honestly say: “We just wanted to transfer the securities.” But they do this when there is minimal liquidity in the order book. At that moment, they move the market, creating a significant deviation in price or volume, which carries signs of manipulation.
In any case, the reason for such behavior is the complexity of non-trade transfers of securities between depositories. Unlike bank transfers, securities cannot currently be transferred with the click of a button. Accordingly, to carry out such an operation, you must contact and fill out an order from one depository for the debit of securities and a corresponding order from another depository for their credit, without making mistakes. You need to correctly specify the security codes, quantities, issuer name; sometimes it is also necessary to know information unavailable to the investor, for example: account numbers and sections of the depositories themselves, details of the contracts they have concluded. Even for experienced investors, completing such transfers can take days or even weeks depending on the depository.
– Is this the problem that the fast securities transfer system is designed to solve?
– Yes, that’s correct. The new service, which starts on September 1, will initially apply to individuals and me2me transfers, that is, transfers to oneself. It eliminates the need to submit an instruction for the crediting of securities to their trading accounts, and also reduces the information that must be included in the debit instruction to a minimum, which significantly simplifies the client process. If it currently takes several days or weeks to transfer securities, under the new conditions with a minimal accounting chain, it will take approximately 25 minutes.
In a year, regulatory timing requirements will be halved. Ideally, we will aim to make transfers instantaneous and also scale the service to other transfers. But to do this, we need to work on standardizing the accounting infrastructure so that all depositories and registrars “speak” the same language. Everyone understands that securities transfers need to be accelerated and simplified. This is a large-scale task that requires significant efforts, including from accounting infrastructure organizations. And we will tackle it gradually.
– The Central Bank is actively involved in the work on the draft law on reforming oversight of insider trading and market manipulation, which is under consideration by the State Duma. One of the changes assumes that the board of directors will have to approve a program to prevent abuses related to insider information. Isn’t this a shift of responsibility from one director to the entire board?
– This concerns the approval of the list of insider information. Currently, this is done by the CEO, while the procedure and timing for disclosure are already determined by the board of directors. We had the idea to transfer the authority to approve the list itself to the board of directors as well. We believed that in such a case a balance would be achieved: members of the board of directors, representing the interests of different shareholders, would themselves assess what specific information could influence the value of the securities. However, not all market participants agreed, as each company had already developed its own practice. Therefore, during the development of the draft law, a middle ground was found. We gave issuers an alternative – to determine who will approve this list themselves: either the company’s CEO or the supervisory board. They can formalize their decision in the charter.
– The bill also assumes that the company is obliged to publish anonymized summary information about the transactions of these very insiders. But if the company has only one or two top managers or there are only one or two insiders in the insider registry, there will effectively be no anonymization. Does the Bank of Russia not see a contradiction in this?
– There is no contradiction here. Companies whose shares are traded on the stock exchange are usually the largest; they have a large number of insiders: there is a board of directors, a supervisory board, and so on. Moreover, if you look at the practice in developed markets, information is disclosed individually for the transactions of each specific insider. We started with aggregated anonymized information disclosure so that a monthly indicator is published on the transactions of all insiders of each specific company, how much they bought, how much they sold.
The market needs to adjust a bit and start actively interacting with the exchange and exchanging information. Issuers need to learn how to obtain information from insiders, especially when it comes to over-the-counter transactions, because information must be disclosed for both exchange-traded and over-the-counter transactions collectively. Over time, it will be possible to consider changing the frequency of information disclosure in the law to a more frequent schedule.
– The insider will be obliged to notify their company about the transaction, and only then must the issuer disclose this anonymized information monthly. But who will be responsible if the insider fails to report their transactions or reports them incorrectly?
– Everything here is very logical. An insider, an employee of the company, will provide the issuer only with information about over-the-counter transactions. Information about exchange transactions will be provided by the exchange. This will be an automated process. The exchange has already prepared a technical solution and will provide this information to issuers free of charge. The accuracy of the data on over-the-counter transactions will be the responsibility solely of the party that provided this information. The issuer is also not responsible for the accuracy of the information provided by the exchange. The main point: only the original source bears responsibility for the quality of the information.
– Issuers will be required to disclose information monthly about the transactions insiders have conducted. This should reduce the number of abuses. But won’t this lead to increased trading volatility?
– You are right, investors will indeed pay attention to what insiders do. But this will not be a decisive factor. Moreover, there will be a significant time lag between the date of the insider’s transaction and the disclosure of the information. I do not believe this will add any excessive volatility to the market. International experience shows that transparency and the quality of pricing for financial instruments only improve. This also simultaneously places responsibility on the insiders themselves. They will understand that the information, albeit with some time delay, will be available to the market.
Andrey Kovalev, Kommersant
Please be advised; This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.